Abraham Accords
.jpg) | |
| Signed | September 15, 2020 |
|---|---|
| Location | White House, Washington, D.C., United States |
| Mediators |  United States |
| Signatories |  Bahrain Israel United Arab Emirates |
The Abraham Accords are a set of diplomatic documents between Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain. They were signed on September 15, 2020 at the White House, with Donald Trump as a witness.[1] It was first an agreement between Israel, and the UAE, but later Bahrain joined due to similar interests. The goal was to make diplomatic relations and trade easier between the countries. The focus was on improving peace and stability in the Middle East.
Background[change | change source]
Arab states and Israel began to normalize their relationship with the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (1979) and the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty (1994).[2] In March 2002, the Arab League also agreed on the Arab Peace Initiative (API). The API is in favor of normalized relations with Israel in exchange for its withdrawal from the occupied territories of Palestine.[3]
On June 12, 2020 Youseif Al-Otaiba, ambassador of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the United States, wrote a piece disagreeing with the Israeli annexation of the West Bank.[4] Following the API, he thought of normalizing relations with Israel to put an end to the annexation. The United States agreed that it was a good solution and decided to supervise negotiations. On August 13, 2020 Donald Trump announced publicly that discussions were ongoing between Israel and the UAE.[5] Following the announcement, Bahrain asked to participate in the exchanges with Israel.[6] The negotiations ended on September 15, 2020 with the official signature of the Abraham Accords at the White House between the United States, Israel, the UAE and Bahrain.[1]
Document[change | change source]
The signatories of the declaration are the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (upper left), the American President Donald Trump (bottom left), the Bahraini Foreign Minister Abdullatif Al Zayani (upper right) and the Emirati minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nayhan (bottom right).
Motives[change | change source]
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain share similar motivations for signing the accords. These include securing peace in the region, shared opposition toward Iran, and wanting improved relations with the United States (US) and Israel. Instability in the region refers to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that has created divisions between Arab nations.[7] The UAE and Bahrain claim that signing the accords will help improve stability due to potential free-trade and economic advantages.[7] However, other members of the Arab League, such as Qatar and Kuwait, refuse to recognize Israel until the Palestinian issue is solved.[8] The UAE, Bahrain and Israel were all opposed to the Iranian Nuclear Deal and sided with the US in fighting the Islamic regime.[3] Donald Trump's role in mediating the agreements, opened doors for more economic and military support from the US to the UAE and Bahrain, particularly naval and aviation resources.[8]
US Role as Mediator[change | change source]
Donald Trump helped mediate the accords and signed the documents with representatives for Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain. The accords were also signed at the White House. Facing re-election, Trump wanted to improve his role in international affairs and shares similar beliefs regarding the Iranian Nuclear Deal and the region's instability.[3] His position also reflects the United State's allies, interests and complicated history in the region.
Impacts and Consequences[change | change source]
Morocco signed a similar agreement with Israel on December 22, 2020. Sudan also declared a wish to normalize its relations with Israel.[1] The other Gulf states did not follow suit.[9]
The Abraham Accords benefited Israel more than the other signatories. Even without annexing the West Bank, the state is able to establish new settlements.[10] It didn't significantly impact the Palestinians. The signatories all gained trade and economic opportunities.[9] The United Arab Emirates and Bahrain won the support of the United States.[10]
References[change | change source]
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 "The Abraham Accords". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved May 2, 2023.
- ↑ Benstead, Lindsay J. (2021-12-27). "Civil society, insecurity and Arab support for normalization with Israel: Contextualizing the Abraham Accords". Mediterranean Politics. 28 (4): 525–553. doi:10.1080/13629395.2021.2008669. ISSN 1362-9395. S2CID 245545841.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 "The Abraham Accords: Israel–Gulf Arab Normalisation". Strategic Comments. 26 (8): iv–v. 2020-09-13. doi:10.1080/13567888.2020.1853892. ISSN 1356-7888. S2CID 227163530.
- ↑ Otaiba, Yousef Al (2020-06-12). "Annexation will be a serious setback for better relations with the Arab world". Ynetnews. Retrieved 2023-05-02.
- ↑ Baker, Peter; Kershner, Isabel; Kirkpatrick, David D.; Bergman, Ronen (2020-08-13). "Israel and United Arab Emirates Strike Major Diplomatic Agreement". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2023-05-02.
- ↑ Ravid, Barak (September 11, 2020). "Behind the scenes of the U.S.-brokered Israel-Bahrain agreement". Axios. Retrieved May 2, 2023.
- ↑ 7.0 7.1 Goldstein, Rami (May 30, 2022). "The Palestinian Refugees in Light of the 2020 Abraham Accords". Middle East Policy. 29 (2): 46–54. doi:10.1111/mepo.12624. ISSN 1061-1924. S2CID 249259066.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Guzansky, Yoel; Marshall, Zachary A. (2020-09-01). "The Abraham Accords: Immediate Significance and Long-Term Implications". Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs. 14 (3): 379–389. doi:10.1080/23739770.2020.1831861. ISSN 2373-9770. S2CID 228954228.
- ↑ 9.0 9.1 Feierstein, Gerald M.; Guzansky, Yoel (September 14, 2022). "Two years on, what is the state of the Abraham Accords?". Middle East Institute. Retrieved May 2, 2023.
- ↑ 10.0 10.1 Fetouri, Mustafa (July 23, 2022). "The Abraham Accords at Two: Who is Getting What? To What Result?". Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. Retrieved May 2, 2023.
