Sectarianism
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Sectarianism means strong support for the ideas of one group, often in religion or politics.[1] It can lead to hate, unfair treatment, or violence against other groups. [2] For example, in the Middle East, sectarianism often happens between different religious groups, especially between Sunni and Shia Muslims.[3] Sectarianism is not only about religion, it also involves identity, fear, and power. In times of war, people often feel more unsure and look to their own sectarian group for protection. This can make them trust others less and feel more separate. [4]
Religious Sectarianism
[change | change source]Although many say religious sectarianism in the Middle East is very old, it mostly started with the 1979 Iranian Revolution. This event made religion more important in politics and made Sunni and Shia groups fight more. Sunnis and Shias are two main groups in Islam, that have different beliefs about who should have led after the Prophet Muhammad. Later events like the 2003 invasion of Iraq made the problems worse.[5]
Turkey
[change | change source]Turkey is mostly Sunni Muslim, but it also has Alevis. They are between 10 and 20 percent of the total population. Alevis are a group within Shia Islam with their own beliefs and traditions.[6] The government supports Sunni Islam more, which sometimes causes problems with Alevis. For example, although Alevis are officially seen as Muslims in Turkey, their special places of worship called cemevis are not legally recognized like mosques are. This means they don’t get government support or benefits.[7]
Iran
[change | change source]Iran is mostly Shia Muslim, and Shia Islam is the state religion.[8] After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s government became led by Shia religious leaders who have strong political power. This created a sectarian system where Shia Islam is favored, and religious minorities like Sunnis and Baha’is often face discrimination. The government promotes Shia ideas inside Iran and supports Shia groups like Hezbollah in other countries, which adds to regional tensions. The leadership uses religion to unify Shia people but also to oppose groups they see as threats, increasing sectarian divisions in Iran.[9]
Iraq
[change | change source]After 2003, when Saddam Hussein was overthrown, sectarian conflict in Iraq got worse. Sunni terrorist groups began attacking Shia people. In 2006, the Iraqi Civil War started; it was between different sectarian Shia and Sunni groups.[10] Many Sunnis said they were being treated unfairly. In 2005, news came out that Sunni prisoners were being tortured by the government.[11] This violence and fear led Iraqis to flee or move to safer areas. These problems continued a long history of sectarian power struggles.[12]
Syria
[change | change source]Sectarianism in Syria was not always violent. Before the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011, people had mixed identities and didn’t always think in sectarian terms. However, when protests began, the regime used fear and rumours to make people afraid of each other and see the protests as dangerous and sectarian. Rumours of attacks on churches or Muslim violence were spread in minority areas to make them scared for their safety. These tactics created panic and suspicion; they turned peaceful protests into a violent sectarian civil war.[13]
Lebanon
[change | change source]Sectarianism in Lebanon is built into the country’s laws and political system, and the country officially recognizes 18 sects. Since Ottoman rule, and later through the 1926 constitution and the 1943 National Pact, power has been divided by religion. The 1990 Taif Agreement also kept this structure.[14] In times of crisis, like the economic problems in Lebanon today, sectarian leaders gain support by providing services and presenting themselves as protectors of their sects. Despite the 2019 protests, this sectarian system remains strong. The state is weak, and powerful sectarian groups make real change difficult.[15]
Political sectarianism being used for State formation and legitimacy
[change | change source]Political parties sometimes try to exploit religious division for political gain. Some might use the process of sectariasation to ensure the survival of the regime. This is carried out by posing a certain group as a threat to the security of the audience the political party wants to reach.[16] This is done to try to make their support fall. Sectarian identity often becomes a foundational element of state legitimacy or identity. An example of this is Iran’s post 2003 political restructuring and the tensions between it’s three main sects, the Sunnis, the Shias and the Kurds.[17] The United States-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 brought the shia majority into power, removing the Sunni ba’ath regime. Due to contrary expectations the Shia refused to form a strictly opposite power pole to Iran and the Sunnis were unhappy with their new role as the underpriviledged minority. Political divisions based on sectarian identity are not just happening in Iran, they could also happen in other Middle East countries that have a large shia minority or a shia majority that feels oppressed. [18]
Sectarian identity and power
[change | change source]The current sectarian situation dates back to the birth of Islam and the “major schism”. The Shi’a separated from mainstream Islam, at first for political reasons and then it became a question of faith. The divide was agravated through centuries of warfare and fighting and the Sunni oppresing the Shia . This shows how sectarian identity is not entirely theological but a politisiced identity rooted in history, marginalisation, and modern power dynamics.
Power structures such as arab nationalist regimes , like the Ba’ath party in Iraq, have reinforced exclusion of shia populations, emphasising the sectarian divides. Power exclusion keeps sectarian identity alive and politically charged. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq systematically excluded Shias from meaningful participation in governance. In Saudi Arabia, the state’s support, in forms of subsidies or acces to services, served to institutionally supres Shia influence both domestically and regionally. [19]
Role of militia, patronage networks, sectarian clientalism
Since the state is unable to provide security and public services to marginalised and vulnerable communities they seek protection from private groups [20] Iran’s support for Hezbollah shows how sectarian militias function as extensions of foreign and domestic political patronage. This provokes rival networks reinforcing sectarian identities through armed and social service provision. [21]
Identity formation
Lebanon is a great example to understand why sectarianism can influence identity forming. Lebanon has multiple sects coexististing within itself, the 3 main ones are the Sunni Muslims, the Shia Muslims and the Maronite Christians [22] This is shown through the education system. Religious communities are allowed to establish their own schools. Most of the lebanese kids are enrolled in private schools, most of them being religious. The government allows these schools to add material to their syllabus making it as such that kids from different schools might not be learning the same things[23]
Related Pages
[change | change source]References
[change | change source]- ↑ Oxford Learner’s Dictionary – Sectarianism
- ↑ Sadik Kirazli, "Sectarian Politics", in Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, Springer International Publishing, pp. 5567–5573.
- ↑ Sadik Kirazli, "Sectarian Politics", in Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, Springer International Publishing, pp. 5567–5573.
- ↑ Helle Malmvig, "Coming in from the Cold: How we may take sectarian identity politics seriously in the Middle East without playing to the tunes of regional power elites", Danish Institute for International Studies, Memo’'.
- ↑ Kabalan, Marwan J. (2019-06-01). "Middle East Sectarianism: A Symptom to a Cause". Arab Center Washington DC. Arab Center Washington DC. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ↑ Zeidan, Adam. "Who are the Alevis in Turkey". Britannica. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ↑ "Turkey: Situation of Alevis, including political and religious rights; treatment of Alevis by society and authorities; state protection (2019–November 2021) [TUR200819.E]". Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ↑ The Association of Religion Data Archives – Iran Religious Profile
- ↑ Zubaida, Sami (Spring 2014). "Sectarian Dimensions". The Middle East Journal. 68 (2). Middle East Institute: 318–322.
- ↑ Hashim, Ahmed S. (January 2007). "Iraq's Civil War". Current History. 106 (696): 3–10.
- ↑ BBC – Iraqi Sunnis demand abuse inquiry, 26 November 2005
- ↑ Hashim, Ahmed S. (January 2007). "Iraq's Civil War". Current History. 106 (696): 3–10.
- ↑ Hadaya, Sami (January 11, 2020). "Sectarianisation in Syria: the disintegration of a popular struggle". Conflict, Security & Development. 20 (5): 607–629. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ↑ Bahout, Joseph (November 18, 2013). "Sectarianism in Lebanon and Syria: The Dynamics of Mutual Spill-Over" (PDF). United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ↑ Assi, Abbas (September 2022). "Sectarian Political Settlements in Lebanon". Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 2025-05-19.
- ↑ [Luomi, Mari. “ sectarian identities or geopolitics?: the regional shia-sunni divide in the Middle East”. Working papers. 2008.]
- ↑ [Luomi, Mari. “ sectarian identities or geopolitics?: the regional shia-sunni divide in the Middle East”. Working papers. 2008.]
- ↑ [Luomi, Mari. “ sectarian identities or geopolitics?: the regional shia-sunni divide in the Middle East”. Working papers. 2008.]
- ↑ [Hameah, satgin. “ Sectarian Divisions, Proxy Wars and Chaos” . E- International relations. 2015.]
- ↑ [Kabalan, Marwan J. . “ Middle East Sectarianism: A sympton to a cause” . the arab World Beyond Conflict.]
- ↑ [Kabalan, Marwan J. . “ Middle East Sectarianism: A sympton to a cause” . the arab World Beyond Conflict.]
- ↑ [Fadlallah, Hanan, and Jan Germen Janmaat. 2023. “History Education and the Construction of Identities in Divided Societies: The Case of Lebanon.” National Identities 26 (1): 65–85. doi:10.1080/14608944.2023.2282479.]
- ↑ [Fadlallah, Hanan, and Jan Germen Janmaat. 2023. “History Education and the Construction of Identities in Divided Societies: The Case of Lebanon.” National Identities 26 (1): 65–85. doi:10.1080/14608944.2023.2282479.]