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Wehrmacht soldiers and journalists with German victims of Bloody Sunday.[1] The photo was utilized by the Nazi press and bears the editor's cropping marks, showing the portion of the image that was intended to be used for publication.[2]

Po trzech latach badań nie mam wątpliwości, że za krwawe wydarzenia z 3 września 1939 roku odpowiedzialność ponoszą niemieccy dywersanci - twierdzi Tomasz Chinciński z IPN-owskiej komisji badającej bydgoską Krwawą Niedzielę. Burza wybuchła trzy lata temu, gdy bydgoski historyk prof. Włodzimierz Jastrzębski ogłosił na łamach "Gazety" rezultaty swoich badań. Wynikało z nich, że w Bydgoszczy nie było zorganizowanej niemieckiej dywersji. Zdaniem historyka Tomasza Chincińskiego wyniki dotychczasowych badań nie pozostawiają wątpliwości, że to Niemcy ponoszą odpowiedzialność za wydarzenia w Bydgoszczy w pierwszych dniach kampanii wrześniowej. - Odnaleźliśmy liczne dokumenty, które wprawdzie nie wprost, ale jako silne poszlaki dowodzą w mojej ocenie jednoznacznie niemieckiej dywersji - twierdzi. Wspomniane poszlaki to m.in. dokumenty Abwehry na temat przerzutów broni z Piły do Bydgoszczy w przededniu wybuchu wojny. Ważnym dowodem jest też notatka szefa niemieckich oddziałów dywersyjnych generała Erwina von Lahousena z września 1939 roku. Chwali w niej bydgoskich Niemców za ataki na tyłach wroga. Gazeta Wyborcza Bydgoszcz 4.09.2006 r.

[3] W 2003 r. z inicjatywy Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, powstał zespół do wyjaśnienia przebiegu wydarzeń określanych przez propagandę III Rzeszy "bydgoską krwawą niedzielą", złożony z kilkunastu naukowców z różnych ośrodków naukowych w kraju. Owocem prac zespół było wydanie przez IPN w 2008 r. publikacji "Bydgoszcz 3-4 września 1939", pod redakcją Tomasz Chincińskiego i Pawła Machcewicza. "Cały zgromadzony w toku badań materiał uprawnia do sformułowania tezy, że 3 września 1939 r. w Bydgoszczy doszło do niemieckiej dywersji, która została stłumiona. Dało to początek, w warunkach wojennej psychozy i niezwykle napiętych stosunków pomiędzy Polakami a mniejszością niemiecką, samosądom, których ofiarą padło wielu niewinnych Niemców, którzy nie mieli prawdopodobnie nic wspólnego z działaniami dywersyjnymi" - napisali w książce Chinciński i Machcewicz.

Czytaj więcej: http://www.polskatimes.pl/artykul/3561171,niemiecka-dywersja-w-bydgoszczy-prawda-o-krwawej-niedzieli-zdjecia,id,t.html?cookie=1


Bloody Sunday (German: Bromberger Blutsonntag; Polish: Krwawa niedziela) was a name given by the Nazi-propaganda officials to a sequence of events that took place in Bydgoszcz (German: Bromberg), a Polish city with a sizable German minority, between 3 and 4 September 1939, immediately after the German invasion of Poland.

The sequence started with an attack of German Selbstschutz snipers on retreating Polish troops which was followed by Polish counterattack. After German Nazis took the city Wehrmacht and Selbstschutz mass murdered Polish hostages. All these events resulted in death of civilians, including German ones, several of whom were part of armed militias trained by German Reich before the war. Polish Institute of National Remembrance investigation reports and confirms 254 direct casualties of Lutheran confession (assumed as members of German minority ), 86 direct victims of Catholic confession (assumed as Polish civilian victims murdered by Germans) and 20 Polish soldiers dead. Approximately 600-800 Polish hostages were shot in mass execution in the aftermath of the fall of the city.

After the Germans took over the city, they killed 1200-3000 Polish and Jewish civilians, as part of Operation Tannenberg. The event and place of execution became known as the Valley of Death. The murdered included the president of Bydgoszcz, Leon Barciszewski.

Identical diversion operations by German paramilitaries but on smaller scale took place in Leszno, Innowroclaw and Poznan[3].

Nazi Propaganda immediately presented the attacks on Polish soldiers and subsequent retribution as example of Poles "murdering innocent" Germans. Fifty Polish prisoners of war originating from Bydgoszcz were later falsely accused by Nazi Sondergericht Bromberg summary courts for taking part in Bloody Sunday and shot. All these murders were officially justified by Nazi regime as an act of revenge for Bloody Sunday.

After the war the Nazi propaganda version of events was repeated either in full or in part by revisionist and nationalist publications in Western Germany which included former Nazis as authors.

The effect of Goebbels propaganda machine was so strong, that even some German and Western historians supported parts of Nazi version or doubted the attacks on Polish soldiers took place.

It was only in recent years that documents were uncovered in German military archives which show that indeed Nazi trained German saboteurs were organized and active in Bydgoszcz during these events.



Terminology[change | change source]

The term "Bloody Sunday" was created and supported by the Nazi-propaganda officials. An instruction issued by the press said:

(...)must show news on the barbarism of Poles in Bromberg. The expression "bloody sunday" must enter as a permanent term in the dictionary and circumnavigate the globe. For that reason, this term must be continuously underlined.[4]

Background[change | change source]

Bydgoszcz was part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth until 1772, when it was annexed by the Kingdom of Prussia during the First Partition of Poland. As a part of Prussia, the city was affected by the unification of Germany in 1871 and became part of the German Empire. It would remain a part of the German Empire until the end of World War I. In February 1920, the Treaty of Versailles restored the city and the surrounding region to the Polish state (the administrative region of Pomeranian Voivodeship). After First World War 85% of Germans previously inhabiting the city left it, as they refused to accept their status as national minority in Polish state. Before Second World War Bydgoszcz counted 143,0075 inhabitants, including 131,295 Poles and 9,208 Germans who constituted just 6,4 % of population of the city[3] Their true strength though wasn't in numbers, but in strong economic position, efficiency of political organization combined with nationalistic determination and coordination with Nazi Reich which supported them morally and financially as part of its efforts to create a fifth column in Poland[3] The emergence of the Nazi Party in Germany had an important impact on the city. Adolf Hitler revitalized the Völkisch movement, making an appeal to the German minority living outside of Germany's post-World War I borders and recruiting its members for Nazi intelligence. It was Hitler's explicit goal to create a Greater German State by annexing territories of other countries inhabited by German minorities. By March 1939, these ambitions, charges of atrocities on both sides of the German-Polish border, distrust, and rising nationalist sentiment in Nazi Germany led to the complete deterioration of Polish-German relations. Hitler's demands for the Polish inhabited Polish Corridor and Polish resistance to Nazi annexation fueled ethnic tensions.

German minority organizations[change | change source]

The relaxation of German-Polish relations in 1934 and Polish economic crisis was used by German minority in to strengthen its position and status. On the forefront of these efforts was Deutsche Vereingigung fur Westpolen(German Union) with headquarters in Bydgoszcz. This organization was led by covert council of nine former German officials and a German officer named Kurt Greabe in charge. In 1937 DV had 2170 members in Bydgoszcz. It's official leader was dr Hans Kohnert who coordinated all actions of German minority in Pomerania and in Bydgoszcz[3] .Another important member of the organization was Gero von Gersdorff, whose name would later be given as one of the masterminds of attacks in Bloody Sunday.Besides Gersdorff, notable leaders of the organization included Friedrich Mielke(in charge of secret training courses for German youth), Waldemar Adelt(in charge of propaganda operations), Armin Dross(in charge of organizing secret training youth camp) and Otton Niefeldt(Abwehr agent and member of the management board of DV). Several of the DV members had secret contacts with Berlin[3].

Since 1934 the position of DV was challenged by Jungdeutsche Partei(JDP)Party of Young Germans. This organization was supportive of Nazism even before Hitler's rise to power.In Bydgoszcz its leader was Walter Stein, and it counted 700 members described as "militant element, full of eagerness to prove themselves,mobile, aggressive, militant, mobile, deeply and honestly believing in the ideas of Nazism". While both parties supported Nazism, they competed between themselves for power and influence in Bydgoszcz. At the same they openly declared their loyalty to Polish state and its authorities, while covertly admitting this was a fake calculated stance before final confrontation with Poland. In addition to these two legal parties, there was a secret and illegal branch of NSDAP led by Heinz Kruger. Counting 480 members it worked to support Nazi propaganda, was extremely nationalistic and had a wide network of covert agents in other organizations as well as various companies and enterprises. The party was working deeply undercover and its ideologically ruthlessly hostile towards Poland. Besides these parties there were other, smaller, but numerous German associations and parties, most of which were more or less influenced by Nazism. Ferdinand Lang wrote about the situation of German minority in Bydgoszcz before Second World:In Bydgoszcz a front of unity emerged against Polish state.In 1935 a declaration was made by German organizations in the city to Polish Prime Minister declaring loyalty to Nazism and stating that Germans will fight for the right of "spiritual assimilation" with their "ideological homeland" After German-Polish declaration of non-aggression, the tensions didn't cease despite outside appearances, German minority in Bydgoszcz started to use Hitler's salute as a form of public greeting, used more and more German in public and expressed contempt to signs of Polish culture in the city. Especially troublesome were the German youth groups who received training from special instructors aiming at inciting German nationalism. After Nazi Germany achieved diplomatic successes on world stage in 1938 such as annexation of Sudetes and Austria, more and more Germans became convinced that Bydgoszcz and Pomerania will become part of Reich as well soon. This resulted in increased radicalisation of German inhabitants of the city. Military style marches, exercises were increasingly carried out by German youth organizations. Despite this, the local authorities restrained themselves from any moves that might antagonize Germany. Rather than calming down the situation, the stance of Polish authorities resulted in more and bolder demands from German minority, alongside with young Germans crossing the border to gain military training in Nazi Germany.

Pre-war preparations for German sabotage and diversion operations by Nazi secret service[change | change source]

The Nazi secret service found Bydgoszcz and Pomerania region an easy target due to sympathetic attitude of local Germans(who counted around x% of local population in 1936)

Operation Tannenberg=[change | change source]

Events in Bydgoszcz[change | change source]

According to the most widely accepted version,[by whom?][source?] the incident stemmed from groups of German saboteurs attacking Polish troops behind the front lines.[5][6] This version holds that, as a contingent of the Polish Army was withdrawing through Bydgoszcz (Army Pomorze's 9th, 15th, and 27th Infantry Division)[6] it was attacked by German irregulars from within the city. According to a British witness, a retreating Polish artillery unit was shot at by Germans from within a house; the Poles returned fire and were subsequently shot at from a Jesuit church.[7] In the ensuing fight both sides suffered some casualties; captured German nonuniformed armed insurgents were executed on the spot and some mob lynching was also reported.[6][8][9] A Polish investigation concluded in 2004 that Polish troops had been shot at by members of the German minority and German military intelligence (Abwehr) agents; around 40–50 Poles and between 100 to 300 Germans were killed.[10]

Nazi Propaganda[change | change source]

For months prior to the 1939 German invasion of Poland, German newspapers and politicians like Adolf Hitler had carried out a national and international propaganda campaign accusing Polish authorities of organizing or tolerating violent ethnic cleansing of ethnic Germans living in Poland.[11][12]


After armed conflict erupted on September 1, 1939, statements that persecutions of ethnic Germans had occurred in Poland, especially in Bydgoszcz, continued to appear in the Nazi press.[13] The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau investigation in 1939–1940 claimed that the events were a result of panic and confusion among the Polish troops.[14] The Wehrmacht investigation included the interrogation of captive Polish soldiers, ethnic Germans from Bydgoszcz and surrounding villages, and Polish civilians. The bodies of the victims were exhumed and the cause of death and the possible involvement of military rifles was assessed.[15]

German reprisals and atrocities[change | change source]

Polish hostages in Bydgoszcz. September 1939

The events were followed by German reprisals and mass executions of Polish civilians.[16][8] In an act of retaliation for Bloody Sunday, a number of Polish civilians were executed by German military units of the Einsatzgruppen, Waffen SS, and Wehrmacht.[17] According to German historian Christian Raitz von Frentz, 876 Poles were tried by German tribunal for involvement in the events of Bloody Sunday before the end of 1939. 87 men and 13 women were sentenced without the right to appeal.[16] Polish historian Czesław Madajczyk notes 120 executions in relation to Bloody Sunday, and the execution of 20 hostages after a German soldier was allegedly attacked by a Polish sniper.[16][18]

According to a German version, Polish snipers attacked German troops in Bydgoszcz for several days (Polish sources and witnesses do not confirm this).[19] The German governor, General Walter Braemer,[20] (the commander of the rear army area), ordered the execution of 80 Polish hostages over the next few days.[16] By September 8, between 200 to 400 Polish civilians had been killed.[17] According to Richard Rhodes,[21] a number of Boy Scouts were set up in the marketplace against a wall and shot; a devoted priest who rushed to administer the last sacrament was shot too, receiving five wounds. Murders continued all week; 34 of the leading tradespeople and merchants of the town were shot, as well as many other leading citizens.

Many Poles, particularly members of the intelligentsia and the Jews, were singled out for deportation, or killed outright.[18] More than 20,000 Polish citizens of Bydgoszcz (14% of the population) were either shot or died in concentration camps during the occupation.[22]

The debate in scholarship[change | change source]

The exact number of victims of Bloody Sunday is disputed. Peter Aurich (a pseudonym of the German journalist Peter Nasarski [23]) put the number of German civilian deaths in Bydgoszcz at 366,[24] while Hugo Rasmus estimates it as at least 415.[16] Two Polish historians, Włodzimierz Jastrzębski and Czesław Madajczyk, estimate ethnic German deaths at 103 (Jastrzębski), and about 300 (150 on September 3, the rest in the days after).[25] The Polish historians point out that since these losses occurred during actual combat, most of the civilian losses should be attributed to accidents common in urban combat conditions; they argue that civilian losses might have occurred when the town was attacked by the German airforce (Luftwaffe).[16] Strafing civilians in the town by the Luftwaffe is confirmed by German witnesses.[26] Nazi propaganda reinforced Polish perceptions of the German minority as hostile, and during the invasion reported that the German minority was aiding the forces. This contributed Polish misconceptions, as the Poles were expecting the German minority to be actively hostile.[27]

An even bigger debate in the scholarship concerns the question whether—as the Polish historiography suggests—there were indeed any members of a German fifth column in the city who opened fire on the Polish troops (and if so, whether they were composed of members of the Bydgoszcz German minority or not), or whether—as critics among the German historiography argue—Polish troops (or panicking civilians) overreacted in the confusion and targeted innocent German civilians.[28]

The account of Peter Nasarski alias Aurich has been called by Harry Gordon[27] one of the most thorough German accounts; his work is however generally rejected in Poland,[23] perhaps because he indiscriminately used witness statements collected by Nazi officials.[29] According to Nasarski, after police forces retreated from Bydgoszcz, agitated Polish civilians accused many Germans of assaulting Polish soldiers and executed them and any Poles who stood up in their defence.[27] Rasmus attributes the situation to confusion and the disorganised state of the Polish forces in the city.[24] von Frentz wrote that "In Bydgoszcz, the event was probably caused by confusion among the rapidly retreating soldiers, a general breakdown in public order and panic among the Polish majority after two German air raids and the discovery of a small reconnaissance group of the German Army on the previous day."[16] He quotes Nazi German reports about the civilian victims and atrocities, later corroborated by a Red Cross commission that the Nazis invited to the scene.[16] von Frentz also noted that eyewitness accounts of atrocities committed against the German population are as unreliable as Polish accounts of the fifth columnists.[16] No ethnic Germans are known to have spoken of participation in that event.[24] In the post-war collaboration trials, no ethnic German was charged in relation to Bloody Sunday.[16][27] Another counterargument to the fifth column theory is that Polish troops were being targeted by advance units of the German regular army (Heer), or that the shots were fired by Polish soldiers in the confusion of the mass withdrawal.[24] von Frentz claims that Polish troops and civilians massacred German civilians due to confusion.[16] Polish historians feel the German historiography is based on Nazi German sources, ignoring numerous Polish sources.[30]

Polish historians, such as Madajczyk, Jastrzębski, Karol Marian Pospieszalski, Ryszard Wojan, and others claim that the killings were triggered when the ethnic Germans, dressed up as civilians, opened fire on the Polish troops(Jastrzebski later changed his views after starting to work with German expelee organizations[31]). The Poles retaliated, killing many and executing prisoners afterwards.[24][25][32] Polish historians like Pospieszalski and Janusz Kutta point to a Nazi top secret false flag Operation Himmler (which took place on August 31 – September 1) and was designed to create an illusion of Polish aggression against Germany.[33][34] Thus there is argument that actions like the Gleiwitz incident and events in Bydgoszcz were all part of a larger Nazi plan to discredit the Poles.[35] Polish historians such as Pospieszalski and Wojan argue that the German fifth column agents (or their higher-ups) might have been deliberately aiming to produce a situation likely to result in German civilian casualties as a way to fuel Nazi propaganda.[5][36][37] This argument has been criticized: Harry Gordon questions whether the Germans were willing to sacrifice their citizens for propaganda gains.[27]

Recent discussion[change | change source]

The modern consensus among Polish historians is that the events constituted an attack on Polish population and military by German militia.[38]

In 2004, historian Tomasz Chinciński in a publication of Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) summarized recent research related to Bloody Sunday, confirming that the majority of historians agree that an "insurrection" by agents who had arrived from the Third Reich as well as some German inhabitants of Bydgoszcz took place.[39] He has published a work detailing new evidence of German diversionary activity in September 1939 in Poland.[40] There are numerous Polish eyewitness accounts of action of a German fifth column which included members of local minority; Pospieszalski cited multiple witnesses for at least 46 cases of German civilians opening fire on Polish troops.[27] There are numerous Polish Army reports[6] and German documents confirming the saboteur actions of armed German Poles in other cities.[6] According to German historians, any members of the fifth column, if present in the city, were infiltrators from Germany, not natives of Bydgoszcz.[16] Eyewitness accounts have been criticised by Richard Blanke.[16] In 2004, Chinciński discussed previously unpublished reports of Polish Army Pomorze, which reported "a large scale diversion" in Bydgoszcz on September 3 and numerous smaller incidents in surrounding area around that time.[6]

A number of Polish and German historians discussed the problem September 4, 2006, at the German Historical Institute in Warsaw.[41] Chinciński discussed newly discovered documents of the Abwehr that show that there were indeed plans for fifth column and diversion activities in Bydgoszcz; he discussed the bias of the Polish communist era historiography, which minimized cases of Polish mob lynching of ethnic Germans, which did occur in Bydgoszcz.[41] German historian Hans-Erich Volkmann noted problems with German historiography, outlining some of the unreliability inherent in early post-war studies, which were still significantly affected by the Nazi era, and that the Bydgoszcz events were and still are used for political purposes.[41] Overall, German and Polish historians continue to argue with one another over the validity of their claims, but a consensus version is emerging.[41]

See also[change | change source]

References[change | change source]

  1. Bundesarchiv description: German: Polen.- Deutsche Soldaten und internationale Journalisten vor Leichen getöteter Volksdeutscher (Opfer des "Bromberger Blutsonntag"
    English: Poland.- German soldiers and international journalists in front of the bodies of killed Volksdeutsche (victims of the "Bromberg Bloody Sunday").
  2. Bundesarchiv (image source) also cites the original caption, which is written in a propagandistic style: German: Herr Chamberlein! Sie haben Polen die Blanko-Vollmacht für diese Schandtaten erteilt! Auf Ihr Haupt kommt das Blut dieser Opfer! Wenn Sie noch einen Funken Gefühl für Menschlichkeit, Wahrheitsliebe und Fairneß im Leibe hätten, müßte Sie das Grausen packen beim Anblick der Bilddokumente über die Bromberger Blutopfer. UBz: Ausländische Journalisten überzeugen sich an Ort und Stelle von den furchtbaren Mordtaten der Polen in Bromberg.
    English: Bromberg, corpses of slain ethnic Germans. Mr. Chamberlain! You gave Poland a blank cheque for this atrocity! On your head the blood of these victims comes! If you had any spark of feeling left, for humanity, truthfulness and fairness, you would have been filled with horror at the sight of the visual evidence of the Bromberg blood victims. For example: foreign journalists bear witness at the scene of Poland's terrible acts of murder in Bromberg. 9.9.39 photo Weltbild Fremke 212-39
  3. 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 "Niemcy bydgoscy przed II wojną światową" by dr hab. Janusz Kutta in Historia Bydgoszczy, Tom II, część druga 1939-1945, edited by professor Marian Biskup, Bydgoszcz 2004.
  4. A. K. Kunert, Z. Walkowski, Kronika kampanii wrześniowej 1939, Wydawnictwo Edipresse Polska, Warszawa 2005, ISBN 83-60160-99-6, p. 35.
  5. 5.0 5.1 Perry Biddiscombe, Alexander Perry, Werwolf!: The History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Movement, 1944–1946, University of TorontoPress, 1998, ISBN 0-8020-0862-3, Google p.207
  6. 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 (Polish) Tomasz Chiciński, Niemiecka dywersja we wrześniu 1939 w Londyńskich meldunkach, Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej, nr 8-9/2004
  7. Erich Kuby: Als Polen deutsch war. 1939–1945; Ismaning bei München: Hueber, 1986; ISBN 3-19-005503-3; p.64–65
  8. 8.0 8.1 Norman Davies, God's Playground, Oxford University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-19-925340-4, p.331
  9. Richard Blanke, The American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 2. Apr., 1992, p.580-582. Review of: Włodzimierz Jastrzębski,Der Bromberger Blutsonntag: Legende und Wirklichkeit. and Andrzej Brożek, Niemcy zagraniczni w polityce kolonizacji pruskich prowincji wschodnich (1886–1918) JSTOR
  10. Böhler, Jochen (2006). Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg. Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939 (in German). Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. p. 144. ISBN 3-596-16307-2.
  11. Address by Adolf Hitler - September 1, 1939; retrieved from the archives of the Avalon Project at the Yale Law School.
  12. Nazi Conspiracy And Aggression, Volume VI. Office of United States Chief of Counsel For Prosecution of Axis Criminality. United States Government Printing Office: Washington, 1946, p.188 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; name "German Editor" defined multiple times with different content
  13. Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, University of Nebraska Press, p.17
  14. Alfred M. de Zayas: Die Wehrmachtuntersuchungsstelle. 6. erweiterte Auflage, Universitas 1998
  15. Friedrich Herber: Gerichtsmedizin unterm Hakenkreuz, Militzke Verlag, Leipzig 2002, p.300.
  16. 16.00 16.01 16.02 16.03 16.04 16.05 16.06 16.07 16.08 16.09 16.10 16.11 16.12 Christian Raitz von Frentz, A Lesson Forgotten: Minority Protection Under the League of Nations, LIT Verlag Berlin-Hamburg-Münster, p.252 – 254
  17. 17.0 17.1 Christopher Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, University of Nebraska Press, p.29
  18. 18.0 18.1 Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, University of Nebraska Press, p. 32-33
  19. Raitz von Frentz, page 254
  20. General der Kavallerie Walter Braemer
  21. Richard Rhodes, Masters of Death (first chapter), The New York Times
  22. Katarzyna Staszak, Guenter Schubert, Bydgoska Krwawa Niedziela. Śmierć legendy, Gazeta Wyborcza, 25-09-2003
  23. 23.0 23.1 Günter Schubert (1989), p. 46
  24. 24.0 24.1 24.2 24.3 24.4 Richard Blanke, The American Historical Review, Vol. 97, No. 2. Apr., 1992, pp. 580–582. Review of: Włodzimierz Jastrzębski,Der Bromberger Blutsonntag: Legende und Wirklichkeit. and Andrzej Brożek, Niemcy zagraniczni w polityce kolonizacji pruskich prowincji wschodnich (1886–1918) JSTOR
  25. 25.0 25.1 Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, University of Nebraska Press, p.441, footnotes 68 and 69
  26. Włodzimierz Jastrzębski, Relacje bydgoskich Niemców o wydarzeniach z września 1939 roku zebrane w latach 1958–1961 i wcześniej w Republice Federalnej Niemiec
  27. 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 27.4 27.5 Harry Gordon (1993). Orphans of Versailles: the Germans in Western Poland, 1918–1939. p. 230. ISBN 978-0-8131-1803-1.
  28. Konrad Piasecki "Włodzimierz Jastrzębski: To co się zdarzyło w Bydgoszczy miało podłoże emocjonalne." September 1, 2003
  29. Thomas Kees (1994). "Polnische Greuel". Der Propagandafeldzug des Dritten Reiches gegen Polen. (Magisterarbeit) (in German). Saarbrücken, Germany: Saarland University. p. 40.
  30. Jastrzębski, Włodzimierz (2008). Historiografia niemiecka wobec wydarzeń bydgoskich z pierwszych dni września 1939 roku (in Polish). Warsaw: IPN. p. 232.
  31. [1] http://www.rp.pl/artykul/61991,355527_Krwawiaca_pamiec.html
  32. Christopher R. Browning, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, University of Nebraska Press, p.442 (footnote 83)
  33. James J. Wirtz, Roy Godson, Strategic Denial and Deception: The Twenty-First Century Challenge, Transaction Publishers, 2002, ISBN 0-7658-0898-6, p.100
  34. Bradley Lightbody, The Second World War: Ambitions to Nemesis, Routledge, 2004, ISBN 0-415-22405-5, p.39
  35. Czy historia jest wybiórcza? "Pomorska" pyta, odpowiada dr. Janusz Kutta, dyrektor Archiwum Państwowego w Bydgoszczy, Gazeta Pomorska, 20 VII 2003
  36. "A jednak dywersja?" Rozmowa z prof. dr. hab. Karolem Marianem Pospieszalskim z Poznania, prawnikiem i historykiem, badaczem dziejów dywersji niemieckiej w Polsce, Express Bydgoski
  37. Wojan, Ryszard (1959). Bydgoszcz Niedziela 3 września 1939 (in Polish). Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie.
  38. [2] Krwiawiaca Pamiec Rzeczpospolita 28.09.09
  39. (Polish) Tomasz Chinciński, Koniec mitu "bydgoskiej krwawej niedzieli" (The End of the Myth of the Bromberg (Bydgoszcz) Bloody Sunday), Bulletin of the Institute of National Remembrance (Biuletyn Instytutu Pamięci Narodowej), issue: 121/ 20032004, pages: 2427
  40. (Polish) Tomasz Chinciński, Niemiecka dywersja w Polsce w 1939 r. w świetle dokumentów policyjnych i wojskowych II Rzeczypospolitej oraz służb specjalnych III Rzeszy. Część 1 (marzec–sierpień 1939 r.). Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość. nr 2 (8)/2005
  41. 41.0 41.1 41.2 41.3 (Polish) Dyskusja panelowa „Wydarzenia bydgoskie z 3 i 4 września 1939 r.” – Warszawa, 4 września 2006 r.

Literature[change | change source]

  • MacAlister Brown, ‘The Third Reich's Mobilization of the German Fifth Column in Eastern Europe', The Journal for Central European Affairs 19/2 (Jul. 1959)
  • Wojan, Ryszard (1959). Bydgoszcz Niedziela 3 września 1939 (in Polish). Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie.
  • Jastrzębski, Włodzimierz (1988). Dywersja czy masakra. Cywilna obrona Bydgoszczy we wrześniu 1939 r. (in Polish). Gdańsk: KAW. ISBN 83-03-02193-1.
  • Schubert, Günter (1989). Das Unternehmen "Bromberger Blutsonntag" (in German). Köln: Bund-Vlg.
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