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Oslo Accords

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The Oslo Accords are a pair of agreements between the government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): the Oslo I Accord, signed in Washington, D.C., in 1993;[1] and the Oslo II Accord, signed in Taba, Egypt, in 1995.[2]

The first ideas regarding the Oslo Accords started in the Madrid Conference for Peace in 1991. The Oslo negotiations were planned in secret and ultimately led to an agreement after nine months. The accords were meant to create a new relationship between Palestine and Israel on a long-term basis. The Oslo Accords intended to create three changes. The first one is that the accords would give the Palestinian people the right to have political control over its own territories, to have a return of Palestinian leadership. The second one is that the Palestinian national movement PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) could resume their struggle with an open mind. The third one is that the accords brought hope to the Palestinians with them, for the first time since the Nakba.[3]

The Oslo Accords were to create a Palestinian state. However, there was never a mention of a state in both of the documents signed in 1993 and 1995. There has never been a mention of a Two-State solution, but it had been assumed that there would come a two state solution by the Israeli side led by the Labor party.[4]

The Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu tried to cancel or delay the Oslo Accords, but because of pressure from the United States and Europe the Oslo Accords were continued.[4]

The Oslo Accords marked the start of the Oslo Peace Process. The 1994 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded jointly to Yasser Arafat, Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin "for their efforts to create peace in the Middle East.

The positions of the main actors at the Madrid negotiations were as follows:

  • Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)'s position was in accordance with the international consensus (including the two-state solution proposed in 1976). It supported the creation of a Palestinian state according to the 1967 borders, demanding that the UN be the guarantor of stability in the region. However, the United States of America ignored these proposals.[5]
  • Israel: the Likud-Labor government did not accept the idea of a Palestine state and rejected any negotiations with the PLO, as they saw a Palestinian state in Jordan. Israel asserted its sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, while allowing so-called free elections under their military rule.[5]
  • United States of America: played the role of a "honest broker", while holding, in reality, superficial negotiations with the PLO through which it imposed acceptance of Israel's conditions, whom they fully supported. They also refused the creation of an international conference (which was invoked by the PLO) in order to remain the sole mediator of these negotiations.[6]
  • In December 1987, the Intifada took place, which was an uprising of Palestinians who no longer endured the harsh conditions under Israeli occupation.[6]

During these negociations, Haidar Abdel Shafi (PLO) stated that Israeli settlements are illegal, as was demonstrated by the UN Security Council and the International Court of Justice, while Israel specified that Palestinians would have more autonomy and would decide on local services, but their settlements would continue.[7]

The Oslo I Accord

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The development of the first of the two agreements, the Oslo I Accord, which they also call the Declaration of principles on interim self-governing arrangements (DOP), took place in the capital of Norway, Oslo, and was a secret effort to help along the peace process.[8]During the secret negotiations in Oslo, Prime minister Yitzhak Rabin sent Yasser Arafat, from the PLO, a letter and vice versa. The letters, from Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin respectively, contained the following: the condemnation of terrorism and violence that threatened the Israeli people and their livelihood, the guarantee, by the PLO, that everything would from now on be in compliance with the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the acknowledgement that the PLO represented the Palestinian people.[8]This correspondence is considered to be an important element of the accord and indicated the willingness of both parties to recognize each other and further negotiate peace.[3] The signing of the letters took place on 9 and 10 september 1993.[8]Furthermore the Declaration of principles on interim self-governing arrangements (DOP) allowed for the reassessment of the status of territories like Gaza and Jericho, which were occupied and governed by Israel and had no self-determination.[8]The accord demanded the withdrawal of the Israeli army from those places first, but the accord contained the promise, and was considered a starting-point, of a five-year process resulting in more self-determination, although limited, for the Palestinians and the partial withdrawal of the Israeli army from territories in Gaza and the West Bank.[3]The people involved in the negotiations in Oslo came together to discuss Palestine’s future on fourteen different occasions in nine months time.[8]The official signing took place the 13th of september 1993[3] in Washington and was witnessed by president Bill Clinton.[8] In 1994, an additional accord was signed, known as the Gaza-Jericho agreement, or the Cairo Agreement.[9]

The Oslo II Accord

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The Oslo II Accord was signed in Taba, Egypt in 1995.[2] Heavy protests followed.[9]

A major event that surrounded the establishment of the Oslo II Accord was that Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated on 4 November, 1995, 36 days after the signing of the Oslo II accords on 28 September, 1995. Shimon Peres would be elected after Rabin.[10]

Apparently fair, the Oslo II Accord offered full maneuvering room to Israel and the USA.[11] Although it was demonstrated that Israeli settlers were illegal, they were to remain under Israeli law- thus Israel retained legislative, executive and judicial power in illegally occupied areas. The agreement formally granted autonomy to Palestinians, but in reality their laws could be annulled by Israel which held a limited form of veto power. Even in Palestinian areas, the rights of Israelis had to be respected- rights regarding government lands and lands that belonged to Palestinians who were later driven out.[12] In addition, Israel did not provide concrete percentages regarding borders. In conclusion, this agreement annulled previous international decisions (for example, that the territories occupied in 1967 did not belong to Israel, the illegality of Israeli settlements, the fact that Jerusalem is not only the capital of Israel, and the right to return of Palestinians).[12]

Some argued that the Accords were not successful because of their provisional nature. “The following are the agreements that made up what is known as the <<Oslo Accords>>

1. Letters of Mutual Recognition between Israel and the PLO - 9 and 10 September 1993

2. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("Oslo-I") - 13 September 1993

3. [Paris] Protocol on Economic Relations - 29 April 1994

4. Agreement on Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area ("Cairo Agreement") - 4 May 1994

5. Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities - 29 August 1994 (additional agreement, 28 August 1995)

6. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ("Oslo-II") - 28 September 1995

7. Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron - 15 January 1996

8. Wye River Memorandum - 23 October 1998

9. Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum - 4 September 1999.”[13]

If Oslo I was a Declaration of Principles (DOP), meaning that it determined the terms of negotiations, Oslo II “contained an Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.”[13] The Interim Agreement considered the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, excluding Jerusalem. The borders between what was to be Palestinian territory and Israeli territory were not clearly defined; this ambiguity was intentional so that the withdrawal would not be clear, distinct, and strong, and the lived reality would not undergo drastic changes. Although Israel withdrew its military control, the settlers and their settlements remained in Gaza, so the withdrawal can be seen as strictly symbolic; Israel continued to control movement and borders; as a result, they protected their economy by granting Palestinians internal autonomy while keeping external reins.[13]

Reactions and Opposition

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People hoped that the Oslo Accords would bring peace to both nations. In Israel, The Likud party was a major opponent of the Oslo Accords. Benjamin Netanyahu and other Likud members disliked the idea of reaching a deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).[14]

In Palestine, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad rejected the Oslo Accords. They believed that the PLO were making too many compromises without getting enough in return. These groups did not stop their attacks, which made it hard for a deal to be accomplished.[15]

International Involvement

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Norway helped start the Oslo peace process by organizing secret talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders in Oslo. These quiet meetings allowed both sides to talk more freely.

The United States supported the peace talks and helped organize the first official signing in 1993. President Bill Clinton hosted the signing ceremony at the White House. Later, the U.S. helped with talks, organizing the Camp David Summit in 2000.[16] European diplomats and UN officials, later mentioned that the U.S. favored the Israelis demands more than Palestinians.[17]

Division of land

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The land got split up in three different areas. The first area is Area A, in which the Palestinian Authority is mostly in control. This area consists of 18 percent of the West Bank, which in the first place only consisted of 3%. The second area, Area B, consists of 22 percent of the West Bank and is under Israeli control depending on security, which means they can enter the areas whenever they want without procedures or legal consequences. The Palestinian Authority is in control of education, health and economy. The third and last area, Area C, is in complete control of the Israeli government. Although it was planned that the Palestinian Authority would gain control over this area, Israel kept being in charge. This area consists of 60 percent of the West Bank.[18]

Unresolved Issues and Their Impact on the Peace Process

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The Israel-Palestine conflict can be defined in 3 ways: “the dispute between two peoples of different nationalities”, “the conflict between Israelis and all Arabs”, “the dispute between two religions, specifically regarding the Muslim religion’s disapproval of a Jewish state.”[19] Until 1918, Jews, Arabs and Christians were under ottoman Empire; at its dissolution, the territory was taken over by Great Britain, which made contradictory promises to Jews (Balfour Declaration) and Palestinians (promised them independence in the same territory).[19] In 1947 the United Nations proposed a two-state solution - one Jewish and one Arab; the proposal was rejected by the Arabs, and the Jews occupied part of the territory, which led to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War after which the state of Israel was created. Israel also won the Six-Day War in 1967, occupying the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights.[20]

Inside the PLO there were discussions post Israel’s invasion of Lebanon – between the idea of a Palestinian state and two-state solution and the recognition of Israel.[21] There were 3 conditions imposed by the USA for opening the dialogue, which PLO accepted: “The Americans demanded from the PLO an acceptance of UNSC Resolution 242 along with explicit recognition of Israel's right to exist. They also demanded renunciation of terror and violence as another condition”.[22] The PLO was in a weak position, both domestically - the ideological shift within the organization and the fact that the Intifada was not an initiative of the leadership - and internationally - due to support for Saddam Hussein. There were also contradictory voices in Israel regarding the recognition of the PLO – the left-wing government rejected the idea of a Palestinian state while the right wing wanted settlers there.[22] Israeli public opinion was strongly influenced by the Intifada “one could not maintain an occupation and deny rights to over three-and-a-half million Palestinians, and expect them to accept the situation quietly and indefinitely”.[23] Therefore, they seemed to accept the two-state compromise. This gradual shift was influenced by 3 factors: the reaction to the Intifada, the threat of radical states (Iran and Iraq) and the end of the Cold War, which meant that Israel lost its strategic value for the USA.[23]

The Oslo Accords did not resolve major issues like the status of Jerusalem, the right of return for Palestinian refugees, final borders, and Israeli settlements. These topics were left for future negotiations, but they became serious obstacles to overcome. As talks paused, tensions, violence and doubt between both states continued to grow. The Second Intifada in 2000 deteriorated hope for peace.[16]

Consequences

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Israelis became aware of the Palestinians' right to their own state only in 1988. Leftist Palestinians supported peace but rejected the Oslo accords since the idea of the Palestinian state was not stipulated in them; Islamist groups rejected both peace and the accords; Israeli opposition – rightists – opposed the agreement, and the vote was split in the Knesset: 61 for, 50 against; Israeli settlers accused Yitzhak Rabin of betrayal in this context and he was later assassinated.[24] Regarding these agreements, Edward Said stated that “it was a framework aimed at changing the basis of Israeli control over the Occupied Territories in order to perpetuate that control".[25] The central problems – Jerusalem, borders, refugees and how the two-state solution would be concretely implemented have no concrete resolution. Critics may state that this process established a functional domination, demonstrated by the increase in the number of Israeli settlers, the low standard of living, and the economic decline of Gaza and the West Bank.[26]

References

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  1. ↑ Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), 13 September 1993. From the Knesset website
  2. ↑ 2.0 2.1 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 28 September 1995. From the Knesset website
  3. ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 Qurie (Abu Ala), Ahmed (2007). "The Oslo Accords: a Palestinian Perspective". Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs. 1 (2): 33–39. doi:10.1080/23739770.2007.11446255. ISSN 2373-9770. S2CID 219291687.
  4. ↑ 4.0 4.1 Shahaf, Emanuel (2018). "A Jewish-Palestinian Federation, an Evolutionary Development of the Oslo Process". Palestine-Israel Journal. 23: 87–96 – via EBSCO.
  5. ↑ 5.0 5.1 Chomsky, Noam (2017). The Oslo Accords: Their Context, Their Consequences. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. pp. 29–30. ISBN 978-9774167706.
  6. ↑ 6.0 6.1 Chomsky, Noam (2017). The Oslo Accords: Their Context, Their Consequences. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. pp. 30–31. ISBN 978-9774167706.
  7. ↑ Chomsky, Noam (2017). The Oslo Accords: Their Context, Their Consequences. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. p. 32. ISBN 978-9774167706.
  8. ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 Shlaim, Avi (1994-04-01). "The Oslo Accord". Journal of Palestine Studies. 23 (3): 24–40. doi:10.2307/2537958. ISSN 0377-919X. JSTOR 2537958.
  9. ↑ 9.0 9.1 Rynhold, Jonathan (2007). "Cultural Shift and Foreign Policy Change". Cooperation and Conflict. 42 (4): 419–440. doi:10.1177/0010836707082649. ISSN 0010-8367. S2CID 145568872.
  10. ↑ Freedman, Robert Owen (1998). The Middle East and the peace process: the impact of the Oslo Accords. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. ISBN 0-8130-2156-1.
  11. ↑ Chomsky, Noam (2017). The Oslo Accords: Their Context, Their Consequences. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. p. 35. ISBN 978-9774167706.
  12. ↑ 12.0 12.1 Chomsky, Noam (2017). The Oslo Accords: Their Context, Their Consequences. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press. p. 36. ISBN 978-9774167706.
  13. ↑ 13.0 13.1 13.2 Hassan, Shamir (July–August 2011). "Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine". Social Scientist. 39: 69 – via JSTOR.
  14. ↑ Staff, ToI. "Full text of Netanyahu's speech at Likud rally". www.timesofisrael.com. Retrieved 2025-05-13.
  15. ↑ "Doctrine of Hamas | Wilson Center". www.wilsoncenter.org. 2023-10-20. Retrieved 2025-05-13.
  16. ↑ 16.0 16.1 Quandt, William (2005). Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Brookings Institution. pp. 373–377.
  17. ↑ "The Palestine Papers | The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs". www.belfercenter.org. 2011-01-26. Retrieved 2025-05-13.
  18. ↑ Haddad, Mohammed (26 Jun 2020). "Palestine and Israel: Mapping an annexation". aljazeera.com.
  19. ↑ 19.0 19.1 DeMetrovich, Catherine (2022). "The Oslo Accords: A Modern-Day Story of Occupation Told Through Violations of the Right to Freedom of Privacy". Indiana Law Journal. 98: 309 – via Indiana University Maurer School of Law Repository.
  20. ↑ DeMetrovich, Catherine (2022). "The Oslo Accords: A Modern-Day Story of Occupation Told Through Violations of the Right to Freedom of Privacy". Indiana Law Journal. 98: 310 – via Indiana University Maurer School of Law Repository.
  21. ↑ Hassan, Shamir (July–August 2011). "Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine". Social Scientist. 39: 65 – via JSTOR.
  22. ↑ 22.0 22.1 Hassan, Shamir (July–August 2011). "Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine". Social Scientist. 39: 66 – via JSTOR.
  23. ↑ 23.0 23.1 Hassan, Shamir (July–August 2011). "Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine". Social Scientist. 39: 67 – via JSTOR.
  24. ↑ Hassan, Shamir (July–August 2011). "Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine". Social Scientist. 39: 69 – via JSTOR.
  25. ↑ Hassan, Shamir (July–August 2011). "Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine". Social Scientist. 39: 70 – via JSTOR.
  26. ↑ Hassan, Shamir (July–August 2011). "Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine". Social Scientist. 39: 70–71 – via JSTOR.
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